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Abstract 
This paper treats the Blitz, the bombing of Britain during World War Two, as a natural 
experiment which can provide insights into the effects of investor sentiment on stock returns. 
The period of the Blitz is very interesting in that one of the world’s major financial centres 
was under regular and severe air attack, as were many other industrial and commercial 
centres.  These conditions provide a unique opportunity to study both investor sentiment and 
local bias effects in extreme circumstances.  We show that negative investor sentiment during 
the Blitz as a whole was not evident. However major bombings in London generate negative 
investor sentiment on stock returns while major bombings outside of London generate no 
negative investor sentiment on stock returns, which is consistent with local bias effects. 
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21. Introduction
This paper examines an interesting period that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been 
investigated in the finance literature. The Blitz, from 7th September 1940 to 12th May 1941, 
was a period of almost continual air attack by German forces on Britain during World War 
Two (WW2 hereafter) with well over 30,000 tons of bombs dropped on the country (Ellis, 
1990, Table 28). The bombings of the Blitz caused great numbers of causalities and damage, 
with over 40,000 civilians killed and 46,000 injured and more than one million houses 
destroyed or severely damaged.  This was accomplished with the loss of about 600 German 
aircrafts (Richards 1952). A substantial proportion of the bombings and many of the heaviest 
raids were on London1, with other major cities also frequently and heavily bombed due to 
their significance in the war effort. The period of the Blitz is very interesting in terms of 
finance theory in that one of the world’s major financial centres was under prolonged and 
serious attack.  Since London is the hugely pre-eminent finance centre in Britain, it is no 
exaggeration to say that most market participants were directly exposed to serious danger for 
a substantial period of time.  Given the extensive recent literature on the effect of sentiment 
and particularly anxiety and fear on stock returns, the conditions of the Blitz generate a 
unique opportunity to contribute to the literature by examining investor sentiment in extreme 
circumstances. The Blitz period also provides an excellent natural experiment to explore the 
local bias hypothesis by investigating whether the Blitz bombings in London had a stronger 
adverse effect on stock returns than bombings outside of London. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we examine a period of the 
British stock market that has not been studied in great detail. Second, we investigate investor 
sentiment in the extreme circumstances of the Blitz taking account of the real economic and 
strategic conditions at the time.  Third, we explore the possibility of local bias on the stock 
market. The results show that stock market returns were not negative during the Blitz as a 
whole, despite the massive damage and loss of life, but that the days after major London 
bombings had negative average stock market returns while non-London bombings were 
associated with positive returns. This suggests that local bias is evident in that investors 
placed more emphasis on the London bombings than bombings outside of London.  
1 London was bombed every night bar one, for eleven weeks during the Blitz period. 
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3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the historical 
background of the Blitz while Section 3 provides a literature review. Section 4 presents the 
methodology while Section 5 presents the data and empirical results. Section 6 summarises 
the findings and provides conclusions. 
2. Historical Background
The Blitz occurred in a period of the war after the fall of France where the only major 
participants were Germany, Britain and Italy, although Italy took very little part in the Blitz 
itself.  The Blitz was immediately after the Battle of Britain, which was the attempt by 
Germany to establish daylight air superiority over Britain after the fall of France in the 
summer of 1940.  The object of the Battle of Britain was to prepare for a cross channel 
invasion and operations largely pitted one air force against another and much of the fighting 
took place around airfields.  The Battle of Britain was a British victory in that Germany 
suffered heavy losses and did not achieve the air superiority they hoped before the bad 
weather of autumn came which led to the invasion of Britain being postponed.  The German 
forces then switched their attack to night bombings of major British cities and this period is 
now known as the Blitz.  They conducted their operations at night as the German bombers 
were hard to see and engage so German casualties would be relatively low.  London was a 
very major objective of the bombers, although many cities that were important to the war 
effort were also attacked.  At the time the potential effect on moral of the bombings on 
civilians was largely unknown and probably overestimated.  It was thought by some that 
mass panic was possible which could serious dent Britain’s war effort (Beevor 2012). 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE hereafter) stayed open during the Blitz, although fear of 
destruction caused 514 of its 784 members to establish an emergency address (Michie 1999). 
Damage only closed the LSE from 16th to 24th September 1940, although trading was 
switched to the settlement room on the 17th September, so only one day’s business was lost. 
Consequently, the LSE stayed open virtually throughout the war although with slightly 
reduced hours. Nevertheless, the LSE turnover was affected with it falling to half its pre-war 
level by 1941. By 1942 however, business began to increase and the LSE was recovering 
back to its pre-war state (Michie 1999). 
London was not the only major city to be bombed by German forces.  For example, one of 
the biggest and most damaging attacks during the Blitz was on the manufacturing city of 
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Coventry on the 14th November 1940.  Some 437 German aircrafts dropped bombs repeatedly 
for 10 hours, with twelve important aircraft plants and nine other major industrial works 
being targeted.  There was a loss of some 500 retail shops, as well as the blocking of railway 
lines, causing great disruption to the war effort (Richards, 1952). Other major cities were also 
targeted due to their importance in the war effort, including Birmingham, Bristol, 
Clydebank2, Hull, Manchester, Merseyside3, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton and 
Sheffield.  For example Merseyside suffered over sixty raids and was Hitler’s number one 
target outside of London due to its granaries, power stations, dry docks, gasworks and its port 
which brought food and materiel across the Atlantic (Gardiner 2011). Other easily located 
coastal cities of strategic importance, such as Hull, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Southampton were 
attacked very frequently (Hull approaching 50 times and Plymouth over 30, Gardiner, 2011). 
 
3. Literature Review 
Investor sentiment on stock returns has been well documented in the economic and finance 
literature in recent years (see Hirshleifer, 2001).  Many routine and seemingly economically 
unimportant factors have been shown to affect returns including the amount of daylight 
(Kamstra et al 2000), sunshine (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003), and even sports results 
(Edmans et al 2007).  An obvious question is how more extreme events may affect investor 
sentiment.  There has been very little research conducted in this area.  Kaplanski and Levy 
(2010) investigate the effect of aviation disasters and find that they cause stock market drops 
that are disproportionately larger than their economic effects and ascribe these to bad moods 
and anxiety being induced among investors. Yet, aviation disasters can only affect the mood 
of investors in a very indirect way by causing them to think about the risk they may 
encounter on future flights. One study that examines the sentiment of stock returns in the case 
of extreme circumstances is Shan and Gong (2012) who investigate the effect of the 
Wenchuan Earthquake on stock returns. They find that during the 12 months following the 
earthquake, stock returns are significantly lower for firms near the epicentre of the earthquake 
and that these results cannot be explained by actual economic losses or by systematic risk.  
Also, Ramiah (2013) examine the effects of the Boxing Day tsunami in 2004 on world equity 
markets and show that equity markets were virtually insensitive to this event despite the 
negative sentiment that prevailed following the event. 
 
                                                            
2 The conurbation around Glasgow. 
3 The conurbation around Liverpool.   
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The literature on financial markets and wars is growing. Brown and Burdekin (2002) study 
two series of German bonds which were traded on the London Stock Exchange from 1924 to 
1930 and find major turning points follow Hitler’s reintroduction of conscription in 1935, the 
outbreak of war in 1939 and the D-Day invasion of June 1944. They also show that the bonds 
sustained a downward trend after 1935 suggesting a reflection of the risk posed by Hitler.  
However the bond prices recovered during the war but appear to anticipate the overthrow of 
Hitler and post-war settlement of foreign bondholders’ claims.  Frey and Waldenstrom (2004) 
compare sovereign debt prices on the Zurich and Stockholm stock exchanges and find 
considerate symmetry in the price responses across the two markets in relation to turning 
points in the war, suggesting that the markets worked efficiently.  Occhino et al (2008) 
employ a neoclassical growth model that incorporates essential features of the occupied 
economy to assess the welfare costs of the policies that managed payments to Germany 
during their occupation of France.  They find that the occupation payments required a severe 
cut in consumption, while a draft of labour to Germany and a reduction of real wages added 
to this burden.  Oosterlinck (2003) studies the information content of French bond prices 
during World War II (WWII) and show that agents ascribed different deault risks to pre-war 
and to occupation bonds, while also documenting that fluctuations in the price differential is a 
pure measure of the relative credit risk, reflecting key political and military events. 
Oosterlinck (2010) analyses the motivations of the legal changes imposed on the French 
exchanges during World War II and show that the most efficient tools for stimualating the 
demand for French state bonds were forced registration and the cap on maximum prices.  
Choudhry (2010) shows that many major wartime events labelled important by historians 
resulted in structural breaks in stock price movements and volatility, while Frey and Kucher 
(2000) find that the loss and gain of national sovereignty during WW2 influenced the bond 
prices of the European countries involved.  Snyder (1990) outlines a rational theoretical 
framework connecting stock prices and war events.  This states that if stock prices are 
determined by flows of expected returns from some real assets and war events have a 
significant effect on these expected returns, then these events will be recorded in prices. Le 
Bris (2012) studies the effects of wars upon the French stock market and shows that World 
War II led to a significant destruction of market values in real terms, and that there was 
strong financial repression which led to a surprisingly short-lived rise of prices until 1943. 
Recently, Hudson and Urquhart (2015) study the major events of WWII on the British stock 
market and find stock returns reacted more strongly to negative events than positive events, 
although there is a limited link between war events and market returns. 
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Given the framework of Snyder we can initially estimate the effect of the Blitz from a 
rational viewpoint without taking account of sentiment.  A huge amount of casualties were 
inflicted and property damaged during the Blitz and attacks were intended to disrupt industry 
and infrastructure and this was substantially achieved.  For example, the major attack on the 
city of Coventry caused a 20% reduction in aircraft manufacture output (Richards 1954).  
Quantifying these effects is a very difficult task and is not the purpose of this paper but it is 
clear that the direct effects on the economy and asset returns must have been large and 
negative.   
 
These negative direct economic effects may have been mediated by strategic and 
macroeconomic factors.  From a strategic viewpoint, historians tend not to view this period as 
a major turning point in WW2.  The greatest threat to Britain in 1940 was undoubtedly from a 
successful cross channel German invasion over the summer.  It was clear to all informed 
parties that a possible invasion of Britain could only take place if the Germans achieved air 
superiority before the bad weather of Autumn set in.  The Blitz period broadly started at 
about the time that invasion became impractical due to weather considerations.  Indeed Hitler 
did indefinitely postpone invasion plans on 17 September 1940 (Gilbert, p125).  Thus the 
‘Battle of Britain’ which took place over the summer is generally regarded as the decisive 
event in this period and this could be perceived at the time.  Whilst not privy to the intentions 
of the German High Command, it would be increasingly evident to the British public that an 
invasion was rapidly becoming more or more unlikely as the Blitz period progressed.  During 
the Blitz period there was perhaps some possibility of heavy bombing resulting in the 
complete collapse of civilian moral and/or catastrophic economic destruction leading to 
defeat.  To some extent the effect of such attacks were unknown and unprecedented before 
the bombing started and surely many people must have felt a good deal of uncertainty over its 
strategic effect.  It seems reasonable, however, to suppose that in the light of the resilience 
shown to the initial major raids fears of a total collapse would soon reduce.  In no account of 
the period does it seem that the bombings brought Britain close to defeat.  The British 
Official Historian’s judgment on the Blitz was that ‘it never brought the enemy within sight 
of inflicting a decisive stroke’ (Collier,1957, p. xvii).  Of course this does not imply that all 
individuals were continually optimistic and these feelings will be captured in the discussion 
of sentiment below. 
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Stock market performance will be affected by macro-economic conditions and these can be 
quite unusual in wartime so it is worthwhile investigating the likely effects of these. Le Bris 
(2012) points out that monetary policy in WWII was very expansive in France leading to 
rises in real assets including stocks.  There were, however, very contrasting monetary policies 
in the UK and France at this time.  The UK financed the war largely through borrowing so 
monetary expansion was very modest compared to that in France.  In France the share of war 
spending financed by money was 34% (Le Bris, 2012, p344), in the UK only  about 6%  of 
the current deficit during the war years was financed by monetary expansion (figures derived 
from Table 4, Broadberry and Howlett, 2005).  Thus it seems unlikely that the stock market 
was unduly boosted by monetary policy in the UK. 
 
If we consider the role of sentiment one would certainly expect the Blitz to have induced 
severe anxiety as the recent literature on terrorism suggests.  Carter and Simkins (2004) 
examine the effect of the September 11th attacks on New York in 2001 and find large 
significant negative abnormal returns for airfreight firms and international airlines. Chen and 
Siems (2004) examine the US capital markets response to various terrorism attacks dating 
back to 1915 and up to the September 11th attacks in 2001. They show that these attacks had a 
significant negative impact on the US capital markets although they are more resilient than in 
the past and recover sooner from terrorist attacks than other global markets.  Further, 
Nikkinen and Vahamaa (2010) examine the behaviour of the FTSE 100 index around the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the July 7th attacks in 
London in 2005. They show that terrorism had a strong adverse effect on stock market 
sentiment with a pronounced downward shift in the expected value of the FTSE 100 and that 
these attacks caused 3 of the 5 largest daily increases in implied volatility from January 2000 
through to December 2005.  Drakos (2010) explore whether terrorism exerts a significant 
negative impact on daily stock market returns from a sample of 22 countries and show that 
terrorist activity leads to significantly lower returns on the day of a terrorist attack occurs.  
Also, the negative effect of terrorist activity is substantially amplified as the level of 
psychosocial effects increases.  Further Kollias et al (2011) examine the effect of the bomb 
attacks in Madrid on 11th March 2004 and in London on 7th July 2005 on equity sectors.  
They find significant negative abnormal returns across the majority of sectors in the Spanish 
markets but not so in the case of London.  They also find that the market rebound was much 
quicker in London compared to the Spanish markets and that the bombings had only a 
transitory impact on returns and volatility that did not last for a long period. Chesney et al 
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(2011) examine the impact of terrorism on the behaviour of stock, bond and commodity 
markets over an 11-year time period.  They find that two-thirds of the terrorist attacks 
considered lead to significant negative impact on at least one stock market and that the Swiss 
stock market is affected by the highest number of attacks, and the American stock market by 
the lowest.  Kollias et al (2013) study the effects war and terrorism have on the covariance of 
oil prices and the indices of four major stock markets using the nonlinear BEKK-GARCH 
model. They find that the covariance between stock and oil returns are affected by war, 
however terrorist incidents that are one-off unanticipated security shocks cause only co-
movement between the CAC40, DAX and oil returns is affected and no significant impact is 
observed in the relationship between the S&P500, FTSE100 and oil returns.  Essaddam and 
Karagianis (2014) examine the effect of terrorist attacks on the stock return volatility of 
American firms and find volatility increases on the day of the attack and remain significant 
for at least fifteen days following the day of the attack.  Also, Essaddam and Mnasri (2014) 
investigate the impact of terrorism on the volatility of stock returns of 17 market indices 
between 1994 and 2005 and find that terrorism has a significant impact on stock market 
volatility. 
 
In summary, during the Blitz period stock prices would be subject to a variety of influences.  
The attacks would clearly have a direct negative economic effect due to the destruction 
caused.  In strategic terms it seems likely that this period was likely to be one of increasing 
optimism in that outright defeat would be evidently becoming increasingly unlikely.  
Macroeconomic policy does not seem to have been such as to have a very major distorting 
influence on the stock market. It seems clear that the Blitz would have caused some extreme 
negative investor sentiment which, on the basis of the past literature, should also depress 
stock prices. The question of interest is whether inferences about sentiment drawn from fairly 
routine events and terrorist attacks hold in extreme circumstances where the stock exchange 
and its participants were under regular heavy attack.  We investigate this issue empirically in 
the sections below. 
 
 
4. Methodology  
In this section, we provide details of the methodology used in this study to examine the effect 
of the Blitz on British stock returns during WWII. 
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4.1. Event Study 
Initially, we examine the next day return on days following major Blitz bombings on London 
and non-London to determine the impact of these bombings on the FT30, a good measure of 
the British stock market at the time.  To further examine the impact of these bombings on the 
FT30, we utilise an event study to calculate the abnormal returns on subsequent days after the 
Blitz bombings.  Since we are examining an index, we utilise the mean-adjusted-returns 
approach of Brown and Warner (1985).  This approach computes daily excess returns of the 
FT30 by; 
 
 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 − 𝐴𝐴� (1) 
 
Where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the abnormal return for the stock index at time t, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the actual observed rate 
of return for this index, and 𝐴𝐴� is the mean return of the index daily returns in the (-61; -11) 
estimation period so that; 
 
 𝐴𝐴� = 150 � 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−11
𝑡𝑡=−61
 (2) 
 
Initially, the event day abnormal returns are calculated. Given that the event date is at t = 0, 
and following Kollias et al (2011), longer event windows are examined by computing the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) ten (t = 10), five (t = 5), two (t = 2) and one (t = 
1) days following the event.  The CARs are estimated using the following equation; 
 
 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇2
𝑡𝑡=𝑇𝑇1
 (3) 
 
Where T1 is the event day and T2 is consequently 5 or 10 days after the event.  We report the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), which are the average of the CARs for each 
event studied. We study the parametric t-statistic as well as the Sign test.  The sign test 
(Cowan 1992) studies the ratio of positive cumulative abnormal returns during the event 
window to number over the estimation window such that; 
 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 = 𝑝𝑝0+ + 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+
�𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+ )/𝑁𝑁 (4) 
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where 𝑝𝑝0+ is the ratio of positive cumulative average abnormal returns during the event 
window and 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+  is the ratio of positive cumulative average abnormal returns during the 
estimation window.  We also utilise the non-parametric Corrado test (1989), where the basic 
principle involves the conversion of abnormal returns into a sequential rank.  As ranks are 
generally not substantially distant from another, ranked distributions are less prone to non-
normality, which is found in Table 1 for the FT30 data. 
 
4.2. Binomial test 
The second stage of the assessment involves testing whether the return on the next trading 
day differs from the unconditional mean return on all trading days.  The non-parametric 
binomial test is chosen as it is robust to the underlying data distribution and so is appropriate 
given the non-normal behaviour of the data. The binomial test examines whether the expected 
return on the next trading day is less than the unconditional mean return after a major 
bombing of the Blitz by considering the proportion of returns after a bombing that are less 
than the unconditional mean return.   
 
4.3. Regression analysis 
To further our analysis, we conduct regression analysis on the FT30 returns to study how the 
market reacted following the bombings of the Blitz. However is well known that seasonal 
anomalies4 are found in stock market data and could skew the results, as evidenced by Zhang 
and Jacobsen (2013) in the UK.  To account for these seasonal effects in the data, we include 
dummy variables in the mean equation of our regression, however unlike previous studies, 
we do not assume all of the seasonal effects exist in our data.  We pre-test the data to 
determine which seasonal effects are evident and only include the significant seasonal effects 
found in the data before the regression analysis.  The seasonal effects examined are the well-
known Monday effect, January effect, turn-of-the-month effect, as well as serial correlation 
in the returns.  It is also well known that stock market data is volatile and has time 
dependence variance.   The time dependency of the error variance violates one of the basic 
Gauss-Markov assumptions for linear regression, therefore making the estimation of OLS 
regressions invalid. Therefore we use GARCH modelling (Bollerslev 1986) which allows for 
time-varying volatility and adds robustness to the results.  
                                                            
4 For a thorough literature review of seasonal anomalies, see Urquhart and McGroarty (2014). 
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Firstly, we examine whether the seasonal effects are present in our data through a 
GARCH(1,1) regression such that;  
 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛽𝛽.𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼1. 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛼𝛼2.ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 (5) 
 
Where rt is the return on the FT30 on day t, γ0 is the regression intercept,  D1it is a dummy 
variable for the seasonal effect examined, ht and ht-1 are the conditional variance of stock 
returns at time t and t-1 and εt and εt-1 are the error terms at time t and t-1 .  If the seasonalities 
are found to be statistically significant, they are included in the proceeding regression 
analysis.  However if the seasonalities are found to be insignificant, we exclude them from 
our analysis.  Therefore, in order to study whether the returns of the British stock market was 
affected by the major positive and negative events, we estimate the following equation5; 
 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛾𝛾1𝑖𝑖5
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖 + 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜇𝜇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + �𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡3
𝑖𝑖=3
+ �𝜏𝜏𝑁𝑁𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀_𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡3
𝑖𝑖=3
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝛽ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 (6) 
 
Where rt is the return on the FT30 on day t, γ0 is the regression intercept, rt-i is the return on 
day t-i. Monit is a dummy variable for the Monday effect.  Jit is the dummy variable for the 
January effect where i = 1 for the first 15 days in January. TOTMit is a dummy variable for 
the turn-of-the-month days and Tit is a dummy variable for the first five days of the tax year.  
Londonit is the dummy variable for a London bombing while Non_Londonit is the dummy 
variable for a non-London bombing. In the conditional variance equation, εt is the error term 
with conditional mean zero and conditional variance ht. However, if any of the seasonal 
effects are not found to be significant, they are excluded from the subsequent regression 
analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, many other alternative GARCH models have been proposed and need to be 
considered since Charles (2010) notes that the choice of model plays an important role 
because results differ depending on the model used.  Therefore we also examine the 
GARCH-M model of Engle et al (1987) which considers the possibility of a trade-off 
                                                            
5 If all the seasonal effects are found.  If some are not found, they are not included in the final regression. 
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between returns and risk by including the conditional standard deviation ℎ𝑡𝑡 in the mean 
equation.  Thus our mean equation takes the following form; 
 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛽𝛽.𝐷𝐷1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜅𝜅ℎ𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡     (7) 
 
If 𝜅𝜅 > 0, then there is a positive trade-off between risk and return, as suggested by portfolio 
theory.  The significance of κ then determines whether the extended model is appropriate.  
We also consider two more commonly used alternative GARCH models, namely the 
TGARCH model.  The TGARCH model of Glosten et al (1993) considers that shocks with 
opposite signs may impact volatility to a different extent and so product terms are added to 
the variance equation such that; 
 
 ℎ𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼. 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−12 + 𝛽𝛽. ℎ𝑡𝑡−1 + �𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣2 +𝑟𝑟
𝑣𝑣=1
 (8) 
 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣 is a dummy that takes the value 1 if 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣2 < 0 and 0 if 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡−𝑣𝑣2 ≥ 0. If 𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣 > 0(𝜆𝜆𝑣𝑣 <0), negative (positive) shocks have a larger impact on the conditional variance than positive 
(negative) shocks of the same magnitude.  This model is appropriate if the asymmetry 
parameter is statistically significant. 
 
5. Data and Empirical Results  
This section reports the data used in this study, the major bombings of the Blitz that are 
analysed, as well as the empirical results of the previously described testing procedure. 
 
5.1. Data 
The data used in this study is from the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary (FT30) Index, the 
standard market index used during the war period, from 1st July 1935 to 31st December 2009 
for the full sample, from 1st January 1939 to 31st December 1945 for WW2 in Europe and 
from 7th September 1940 to 12th May 1941 for the Blitz.  The FT30 was devised by Maurice 
Green and Otto Clarke from the Financial News in 1935 and was called the Financial News 
30 until the paper merged with the Financial Times in 1945.  The FT30 is based on the share 
prices of 30 British companies and is made up of those in the industrial and commercial 
sectors and exclude the financial sector and government stocks.  The index is based on the 
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equal weighting of the 30 constituents and the constituents only change when a company 
needs to be removed for reasons such as mergers and failures.  A new company is selected 
based on a number of considerations, such as the constituents must reflect the breadth of the 
UK economy, the shares must be actively traded and not in the hands of a small number of 
holders, the company is a leaders in its field and is UK-based, and that the shares trade 
without any undue influence on the price from overseas, although this consideration is less 
relevant today. Only two original constituents remain in the index from 1935, namely GKN 
and Tate and Lyle6. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the index and the daily returns on the index.   Descriptive statistics 
shown in Table 1 reveal the mean return during the Blitz is positive and higher than the mean 
during both the rest of the war and the full sample. The standard deviation of returns during 
the Blitz is lower than during the rest of war and during the whole sample period.  It appears 
that there is no evidence of the Blitz period being negative for stock prices. It seems that, in 
broad terms, the greater grounds for optimism about the ultimate outcome of the war 
exhibited in this period might have outweighed the physical damage caused and any 
sentiment effects. 
 
To examine in detail the effect of individual Blitz bombings on the British stock market, we 
examine the 8 heaviest air raids that caused the most deaths in London and outside of 
London.  We select these raids for investigation because they are relatively very large and 
well documented. The bombings selected along with notes about the magnitude of the 
bombings are documented in Table 27. 
 
Most of the bombings during the Blitz were of quite small scale compared to the ones we 
have used in our study and very frequently do not have reliable data.  Often several cities 
were attacked on the same night.   Needless to say there was a lot of confusion at the time and 
also quite a lot of disinformation.   A lot of the information about the bombings was 
suppressed or manipulated in the mass media to keep up civilian moral and to confuse the 
Germans.  For example, except for the largest cities like London and Liverpool, the media 
was not allowed to mention the name of a town that was bombed until 28 days after the attack 
and even then the precise date of an attack could not be given (Gardiner, 2011, p163).  
                                                            
6 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2a796c32-a0bd-11e0-b14e-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3YgshomAP 
7 For further details of the bombings, see Gardiner (2011). 
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Regional Information Officers were permitted to release lists of casualties but without 
addresses (Gardiner, 2011, p162). There seem to be reasonably reliable figures on the total 
casualties in different regions over the whole period but not for individual raids apart from 
the major ones we have already covered in detail.   
 
Overall a reasonable model of the period is of very frequent, mainly small raids, almost every 
night, causing some casualties across the country, about half of them in London, punctuated 
by the much more damaging raids we have covered.  The effect of the extremely numerous 
small raids is probably best captured by the overall movement of the index across the whole 
period whereas it is useful to consider the effects of the largest raids individually.   
 
Comparing attacks outside London with those in London gives a reasonable proxy for the 
sentiment effect.  Both types of bombings would have military and civil (economic) 
consequences but the ones in London would have a much greater effect on the sentiment of 
market operators (due to the fact they were under personal threat and also because the attacks 
were extremely apparent whereas news about the ones at a distance was often concealed).  In 
terms of the military and economic effects the Germans would presumably be choosing 
targets exogenously to maximize these effects so one would not expect a systematic 
difference between attacks on different regions in respect of these elements even given some 
clear differences between regions such as the fact the human capital was probably greater on 
average in London and some cities were better defended or more inacessible than others.  
London was probably the most defended city although considerable resources were devoted 
to defending other targets.  During the Battle of Britain anti-aircraft artillery had been mainly 
deployed to defend factories and airfields so at the start of the Blitz there was only a small 
force of 264 guns defending London (Gardiner, 2005, p340).  Moreover, for technical 
reasons, defenses against night attacks were generally very ineffective at this stage of the war 
which is indeed why the Luftwaffe had switched from daylight raids.    The RAF had very 
few specialized night fighters and their main day fighters, the Spitfire and Hurricane, were 
unsuitable for night fighting.  Anti-aircraft artillery was quite ineffective against German 
bombers even in large concentrations and in practice was mainly useful as a means of raising 
civilian morale by giving the impression that a fight back was in progress (Gardiner, 2011, 
p35) .  To some extent London was actually a relatively easy target given its size and the fact 
it was fairly close to the German airfields as night navigation and bomber range were very 
significant constraints at this stage in the war.  
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5.2. Empirical Results 
Table 3 presents the next day return and reveals that the returns on the day after a major air 
raid in London are all negative, indicating that the bombings had a negative effect on the 
British stock market.  However, the returns after the major air raids outside of London are all 
positive.  The mean return the day following a major London bombings is -0.00264 while the 
return the day following a major non-London bombing is 0.00286.  The t-test comparing the 
means of the two samples is highly significant at 1%, indicating there is a significant 
difference in the return the day after a London and a non-London bombing, supporting the 
local bias hypothesis.  The positive average return following a major non-London bombing 
may be explained by the fact that news of these raids was largely suppressed in the media 
with the implication that these bombings were little recognized by London based investors 
and so were not reflected in the market. In addition, as large numbers of German bombers 
were used in these raids presumably bombings in and near London would have relatively 
light which might have been taken as quite a positive development by London based 
investors 
 
The event study results are presented in Table 4 where the CAARs and significance levels are 
reported for 0, 1, 2 and 5 days following the major bombings in London and outside of 
London.  The results show that the CAARs are all negative for days following bombings in 
London, although insignificant, while the CAARs for bombings outside of London are 
positive for the day of the bombings and the day following a bombing.  However when the 
event window is stretched to 2-days and 5-days after a non-London bombing, the CAARs are 
positive and insignificant. Therefore the results for the event study suggest that bombings in 
London had a subsequent negative impact on the FT30 while non-London bombings had little 
impact on the FT30, again supporting the local bias hypothesis. 
 
The binomial statistics in Table 5 indicate that the average return on the FT30 after a major 
London bombing are statistically significantly less than the unconditional mean return 
throughout the period.  Further, the average returns after major non-London bombings are 
statistically significantly more than the unconditional mean return.  These results confirm the 
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earlier findings that returns after a London bombing caused negative sentiment in stock 
returns and non-London bombings caused no negative sentiment. 
 
Table 7 reports the regression analysis, but initially we investigate the existence of anomalies 
in our data.  Table 6 shows significant evidence of serial correlation up to lag 4 but no 
significant evidence at the 5% level of any of the other anomalies, therefore only serial 
correlation is included in our analysis.  The GARCH(1,1) regression results in Table 7 show 
that the London bombings generate a negative effect on the FT30, with the coefficient 
statistically significant at the 10% level.  However the bombings outside of London generate 
a positive coefficient, indicating no negative sentiment on the FT30.  For robustness 
purposes, we also run two other GARCH models, namely the TGARCH(1,1) and GARCH-
M(1,1) models.  We show that the asymmetric parameter is statistically significant and the 
GARCH-M parameter is insignificant, indicating that the TGARCH model is appropriate, but 
not the GARCH-M model. The TGARCH model shows that London bombings generate a 
significant negative coefficient, indicating the negative effect these bombings had on the 
FT30.  The non-London bombings generate a positive coefficient, again suggesting no 
sentiment was attached to bombings outside of London. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The attacks during the Blitz period would clearly have a direct negative economic effect due 
to the destruction caused.  In strategic terms it seems likely that this period is likely to be of 
increasing optimism in that outright defeat would be evidently becoming increasingly 
unlikely.  Macroeconomic policy does not seem to have been such as to have a very major 
distorting influence on the stock market. 
 
This paper has examined investor sentiment during extreme circumstances when the lives of 
investors were at risk.  We find that the Blitz period as a whole did not experience negative  
stock returns.   This is puzzling in the light of the recent literature on investor sentiment 
which indicates that bad moods and anxiety can be expected to have a substantial negative 
influence on stock prices as this surely was a period of great anxiety.  The explanation 
perhaps lies in examining the full range of influences on stock prices during the period.  
Whilst the attacks would clearly have a direct negative economic effect due to the destruction 
caused and macroeconomic policy was not overly positive it seems likely that, in overall 
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strategic terms, this period was one of increasing optimism in that outright defeat was 
evidently becoming increasingly unlikely.   
 
When we look at individual major bombings, we find that major London bombings have a 
negative impact on the FT30, while major non-London bombings have a positive impact on 
the FT30. These findings are in accordance with the idea that the major bombings in London 
had a strong but short-term impact creating negative sentiment amongst the main stock 
market investors.   In contrast, there is no evidence that  non-London bombings created a 
similar negative sentiment amongst investors . Although the eLondon bombings did have a 
short-term impact on the stock market, but they weren’t strong enough to overcome the 
generally positive trends in the Blitz period as a whole.  Overall,  this paper supports the 
existence of a sentiment effect and the local bias hypothesis, with results strong and robust to 
a number of testing procedures. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for daily returns.  The value in parentheses is the t-test two sample to investigate 
whether the mean during the blitz was significant different to the mean over the full sample period. 
Data Obs Max Min Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Blitz 174 0.0138506 -0.0138506 0.0003225 0.0042991 0.20164 1.12256 
Rest of War 1610 0.0590633 -0.0484122 0.0002139 0.0062050 -0.63744 18.10595 
Full Sample 19155 0.1078119 -0.1240017 0.0001538 0.0105848 -0.19631 9.69967 
 
 
City Date Notes 
London 7th Sep First real raid of the Blitz, with 300 bombers and more than 600 fighter planes 
over the city. 430 were killed, with 1600 seriously injured. 
London 8th Sep 200 German planes pounded the City, with every railway line out of London to 
the south out of action.  412 Londoners were killed, and 747 seriously injured. 
London 9th Sep The raid lasted nearly 10 hours, killing 370 people and injuring 1400. 
Coventry 14th Nov 500 tons of high-explosive bombs and 30,000 incendiaries fell, with 568 people 
killed and 1256 injured. 
Birmingham 22nd +23rd Nov 682 dead, 1057 injured and 2000 houses damaged. 
Bristol 25th Nov 1540 tons of high explosives, 47 tons of oil bombs and 12500 incendiaries 
dropped, 207 dead and 187 seriously injured and 703 slightly hurt. 
Sheffield 12th Dec 300 bombers, 750 dead and 500 injured. 
Merseyside 22nd Dec 119 fatalities and the town of Wallasey suffered badly.  The previous 3 nights 
caused 702 deaths and the same again injured. 
Manchester 22nd + 23rd Dec On the first night, 272 tons of high explosive bombs and 100 incendiaries, while 
on the second 195 tons of high explosive bombs dropped and 900 incendiaries.  
In total, 684 died 2364 wounded and 8000 houses uninhabitable. 
London 27th Dec 48 German aircraft bombed the city from Chelsea to Dalston.  Parachute mines 
caused many fires, killings 141 people and injuring 455. 
London 29th Dec 120 tons of high explosives and 22000 incendiaries were dropped on the city, 
with 160 dead and 500 injured. 
Clydebank 14th Mar 268 tons of bombs and 1630 incendiaries were dropped on the day before and 
227 tons of high explosive bombs and 781 incendiaries dropped on the 14th, with 
a total of 1083 dead. 
London 16th Apr 66 of the 101 London boroughs reported bomb damage and over 2250 fires 
burning, killing 1180 and seriously injuring 2230. 
London 19th Apr More than 1000 tons of high explosives were dropped plus 153,096 incendiaries, 
the most ever in a single night raid.  146 people died, with 46 missing.  This was 
the biggest single raid on London during the war. 
Plymouth 21st Apr 10,000 incendiary dropped killing 750 civilians. 
London 10th May 1436 people killed, 1800 seriously injured with 11,000 houses damaged beyond 
repair. 
 
 
Table 2: The cities in which the air raids took place, including the date and some information on the size and 
impact of the raids.  The bombings dates and information is taken from Gardiner (2011). 
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Table 6: Regression results for calendar anomalies.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Monday Effect January Effect TOTM Effect Returns-1 Returns-2 Returns-3 Returns-4 Returns-5 
-0.001494* 
(-1.94) 
0.002438* 
(1.69) 
0.000706 
(1.07) 
0.257662*** 
(5.46) 
0.819366*** 
(167.83) 
0.196247*** 
(3.15) 
-0.217735*** 
(-3.79) 
0.001303 
(0.02) 
 
Table 5: Test results from the binomial statistics.  Conditional mean = 0.00032.  ***, **, * indicating 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 No. of Bombings No. of returns < conditional mean 
London Bombings 8 8*** 
Non-London Bombings 8 2*** 
 
Table 3: The major bombings on London and outside of London next day’s return, along with 
the t-test for the returns the day after a major bombing in London against the returns the day 
after a major bombing outside of London.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
City Date Next Day Return City Date Next Day Return 
 
 
 
London 
7th Sep -0.00313 Coventry 14th Nov 0.00700 
8th Sep -0.00313 Bristol 25th Nov 0.00428 
9th Sep -0.00471 Birmingham 22nd+23rd Nov 0.00430 
27th Dec -0.00285 Sheffield 12th Dec 0.00 
29th Dec -0.00285 Merseyside 22nd Dec 0.00143 
16th Apr 0.00 Manchester 22nd +23rd Dec 0.00143 
19th Apr -0.00150 Clydebank 13th+14th Mar 0.00446 
10th May -0.00294 Plymouth 21st Apr 0.00 
 Mean return -0.00264  Mean return 0.00286 
 t-test for two sample = 5.43*** 
 
Table 4: Cumulative average abnormal returns of the FT30 from London and non-London bombings.  
Parametric t-test p-values, as well as non-parametric Corrado and Sign test p-values also reported.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively with respect to the parametric t-statistic.  
 
Pos:Neg CAAR Prob Corrado Rank Prob Sign Test Prob 
London Bombings   
      [0; 0] 02:06 -0,0409 0,8505 -0,9305 0,3521 -0,6767 0,4986 
[0; 1] 02:06 -0,0576 0,8512 -0,5944 0,5522 -0,6767 0,4986 
[0; 2] 04:04 -0,0778 0,8580 -0,3722 0,7097 0,7919 0,4284 
[0; 5] 04:04 -0,1359 0,7985 -0,4323 0,6655 0,7919 0,4284 
Non-London Bombings  
      [0; 0] 05:04 0,3304 0,1783 17,442 0,0811 15,129 0,1303 
[0; 1] 04:05 0,2245 0,5178 0,1612 0,8719 0,7985 0,4246 
[0; 2] 05:04 -0,4711 0,3373 -0,3698 0,7115 15,129 0,1303 
[0; 5] 04:05 -0,6256 0,2982 -0,3573 0,7209 0,7985 0,4246 
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Table 7: Regression results for the London and non-London raids.  The value in parentheses is the corresponding 
t-statistic.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 GARCH(1,1) TGARCH(1,1) GARCH-M(1,1) 
Blitz Major Bombings    
α 0.000102 
(0.29) 
0.000453 
(1.37) 
-0.000995 
(-0.67) 
γ1 0.197187** 
(2.01) 
0.147968 
(1.61) 
0.198953** 
(2.02) 
γ2 0.736667*** 
(18.38) 
0.733677*** 
(17.42) 
0.747112*** 
(17.79) 
γ3 0.018377 
(0.17) 
0.054919 
(0.52) 
-0.020363 
(-0.19) 
γ4 -0.289185*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.280718*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.304036*** 
(-3.96) 
σ -0.004208* 
(-1.87) 
-0.004753** 
(-2.32) 
-0.003838 
(-1.51) 
τ 0.002340 
(1.17) 
0.000454 
(0.20) 
0.002062 
(0.93) 
κ - - 62.44969 
(0.75) 
c 0.000007 
(1.45) 
0.000004 
(1.31) 
0.000008 
(1.23) 
δ 0.247815 
(1.53) 
0.349187* 
(1.92) 
0.184945 
(1.25) 
β 0.434992 
(1.37) 
0.648025*** 
(3.01) 
0.425973 
(1.06) 
λ - -0.353039** 
(-1.99) 
- 
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Figure 1: FT30 index during the Blitz 
 
Figure 2: FT30 returns during the Blitz 
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